





Truth: A Multiple-Fit Theory
Abstract
This theory tries to shed light on how we understand and use the notion of truth. It draws on 
some views of Putnam and Goodman, but it develops these views by claiming that truth is a 
matter of a statement fitting one or more of the following: the criterion of internal consist-
ency; sensory data; data from memory; non-verbalized beliefs; other parts of discourse. 
The common cognitive structure, as delineated by Ray Jackendoff, that serves as a locus 
of convergence for meaning conveyed via language, background knowledge, perception, 
inference, etc. is identified as the medium of the fit that results in the “that’s true” effect. 
The theory also claims that truth is a family, encompassing different kinds of truths. It is 
pointed out that truth has a normative dimension, which is cashed out as the possibility of 





so	to	speak,	of	this	conception	is	the	following:	Truth comes with MIND im-
printed on it. Obviously,	then,	this	conception	falls	under	what	Künne	(2003)	
calls	alethic anti-realism:	the	view	that	truth	is	epistemically	constrained,	that	
it	does	not	outrun	rational	acceptability.	However,	the	theory	to	be	presented	
















ries,	 the	 coherence	 theories,	 the	 pragmatic	















ity	might	be	 just	 the	kind	of	 inclination	of	 the	mind,	 an	 inclination	 to	 ask	
certain	questions	or	proceed	along	certain	chains	of	reasoning,	that	Kant	and	









This	 theory	 is	 therefore	meant	 to	 have	more	 empirical	 content	 than	many	
contemporary	 theories	 (including	 Künne’s)	 and	 to	 draw	 on	 contemporary	
work	 in	 cognitive	 science.	Conceived	 this	way,	 it	 can	 afford,	 I	 believe	 (or	
hope),	to	be	a	bit	less	precise	on	some	terminological	issues.	Namely,	I	will	
not	 dwell	 long	 on	 the	 issue	whether	 it	 is	 utterances,	 sentences,	 statements	










one	would	have	 to	confront	Russell’s	and	other	 strange	views	on	what	 the	
constituents	of	propositions	are,	what	their	metaphysical	status	is,	etc.).	How-




















truth	as	idealized rational acceptability, and	he	presents	Goodman’s	approach	
(cf.	 his	 1978)	 as	 a	 version	 of	 this	 conception	 that	Künne	 calls	permanent 
acceptability;	 and	he	 presents	 convincing	 arguments	 against	 these	 concep-
tions	 (some	due	 to	Putnam	himself).	But	Künne	 seems	 to	neglect	 a	 strand	
in	 the	conceptions	of	 truth	endorsed	by	 these	 two	philosophers,	and	 this	 is	
an	important	strand	that	they	share,	where	Putnam	takes	his	cue	from	Good-
man.	Putnam	says:	“Truth	is	ultimate	goodness	of	fit”	(1981:	64,	 italicized	
in	 the	original),	 and	also:	“Truth	 […]	 is	 […]	some	sort	of	 ideal	coherence	
of	our	beliefs	with	each	other	and	with	our	experiences	as	those	experiences	
















anyway	(even	independently	of	 the	Künne/later	Putnam	criticisms,	 that	 is),	
for	if	we	may	presume	that	it	is	rational	to	accept	what	is	true,	such	a	con-
ception	will	 lead	us	 into	circularity	(because	it	will	entail	 that	 it	 is	rational	
to	accept	what	is	ideally	rationally	acceptable).	Now,	this	notion	of	fit	is	left	








This	 validity	 is	 open	 to	 question.	 Künne’s	
modest account of truth, as	 he	 terms	 it,	 is	
condensed	in	the	following	formula:	for	each	
x	 (x	 is	 true	 iff	 there	 is	 a	 proposition	p	 such	
that	 (x	 is	 the	proposition	 that	p,	 and	p)),	 cf.	





whereas	 in	 its	 first	 occurrence	 it	 stands	 for	
an	object	(a	proposition).	So,	interpreted	one	
way,	 the	 biconditional	 is	 incoherent,	 for	 the	
same	 bound	 variable	 doesn’t	 always	 range	
over	the	same	things;	interpreted	another	way,	
so	 that	 the	 variable	 ‘p’	 does	 always	 range	
over	 the	 same	objects,	 namely	 propositions,	
it	 is	 circular,	 because	 the	 predicate	 ‘is	 true’	
would	have	to	appear	in	the	final	conjunct	of	
the	 formula	 taking	 ‘p’	 as	 argument	 in	 order	
that	a	claim	be	made	and	the	formula	be	valid.	








portant	 as	 they	may	 be,	 they	would	 lead	 us	
astray.
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the	data	of	perception	are	always	subject	 to	change	 (both	 in	 the	sense	 that	
things	change	in	front	of	our	eyes,	and	that	these	data	“enter”	and	“exit”	our	
short-term	memory,	with	only	some	of	them	sticking	around	by	being	stored	



















to	 understand	 it?	Well,	we’ll	 have	 to	 conceptualize	 some	 sort	 of	 a	whole,	
because	that’s	what	the	world	is	–	but	in	this	context	it	is	a	qualified	whole,	
namely	the	word	‘world’	does	not	here	mean	something	like	a	totality	of	facts,	
objects	or	 appearances,	but	 rather	 it	 is	meant	 to	have	us	 conceptualize	 the	













always,	 i.e.	 in	 principle,	 expressible	 in	 lan-
guage?	I	suppose	so,	if	we	put	enough	effort	


















in	 short-term	 memory;	 however,	 short-term	
memory	comprises	much	more	than	the	data	



















eration	 of	 meaning	 composition,	 can’t	 be	 a	





































































































The	 term	 is	 Lakoff’s	 (cf.	 his	 1987,	 passim;	
definition	on	p.	68).
14
The	 latter	 two	 are	 by	 no	 means	 the	 same	
thing.	We	could	deem	a	novel	to	be	a	“true”	







vant,	 in	 the	 sense	 of	 the	 axioms	 and	 other	
theorems,	as	well	as	the	rules	of	inference,	a	

















5. The normativity of truth
Undoubtedly,	certain	uneasiness	will	have	settled	on	most	readers	by	now:	do	
I	mean	to	say	that	truth	is	whatever	somebody,	or	some	community,	deems	






transcendental	 authority	 (be	 it	 “the	 facts”,	God	 and	 his	 Eye,	 or	whatever)	
which	would	play	the	role	of	the	final	judge	of	truth	–	rather,	it	is	cashed	out	in	








but	I	 think	it	 is	a	good	one	to	have,	and	it	 is	not	open	to	refutation,	due	to	













somebody	else	might	correct	him	by	having	a	better insight,	by	seeing things 




Descartes	 could	 have	 claimed	 that	 he	 knew	 of	 one);	 but	 to	 consider	 them	
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Joško Žanić
Istina: teorija višestrukog podudaranja
Sažetak
Ova teorija pokušava rasvijetliti kako razumijevamo i rabimo pojam istine. Teorija se nadove-
zuje na neka gledišta Putnama i Goodmana, no razvija ta gledišta tvrdeći kako se istina sastoji 
u tome da se iskaz podudara (“fits”) s jednim od sljedećih parametara ili s više njih: kriterij 
interne konsistentnosti; osjetilni podaci; podaci iz pamćenja; ne-verbalizirana vjerovanja; dru-
gi dijelovi diskursa. Opća kognitivna struktura, koja, prema Rayu Jackendoffu, služi kao točka 
konvergencije za značenje preneseno jezikom, pozadinsko znanje, opažanje, zaključivanje, itd., 
identificira se kao medij podudaranja koje rezultira kognitivnim učinkom: »to je istina«. Teorija 
također tvrdi kako je istina pojam-obitelj, obuhvaćajući različite vrste istine. Ukazuje se na to 
da istina ima normativnu dimenziju, koja se obrazlaže kao mogućnost izazova tvrdnjama koje 








like	 “obligatory	 for	 any	 rational	 agent”,	 not	
“mind-independent”	(as	it	commonly	does	to-
day).	So,	truth	is	argued	here	to	be	mind-rela-




I	 wasn’t	 concerned	 here	 with	 the	 meaning	

















Wahrheit: Theorie der multiplen Übereinstimmung
Zusammenfassung
Diese Theorie versucht zu durchleuchten, auf welche Weise wir den Begriff der Wahrheit ver-
stehen bzw. sich dessen bedienen. Sie knüpft an manche Standpunkte Putnams und Goodmans 
an, baut sie überdies aus, indem sie behauptet, die Wahrheit bestehe darin, dass die Aussage mit 
einem oder mehreren der folgenden Parameter konform gehe („fits“): Kriterium der internen 
Konsistenz; Sinnesdaten; Gedächtnisdaten; nicht verbalisierten Glauben; sonstigen Diskurs-
teilen. Die allgemeine kognitive Struktur – die nach Ray Jackendoff als Konvergenzpunkt für 
sprachlich übertragene Bedeutung, Hintergrundwissen, Wahrnehmung, Schlussfolgerung usw. 
fungiere – wird als Medium des Übereinstimmens identifiziert, das in der kognitiven Das-ist-
Wahrheit-Auswirkung resultiert. Die Theorie erklärt ebenso die Wahrheit für einen Familien-
begriff, indem sie diverse Wahrheitsvarianten erfasst. Es wird auf die normative Dimension der 
Wahrheit hingewiesen, die als Möglichkeit der Herausforderung an die Wahrhaftigkeit präten-
dierenden Beteuerungen substanziiert wird, was allerdings ein regulatives Ideal der univer-




La vérité : la théorie de la correspondance multiple
Résumé
La présente théorie tente de mettre en lumière notre compréhension et notre utilisation de la 
notion de vérité. Elle rejoint certains points de vue de Putnam et de Goodman, mais les déve-
loppe en estimant que la vérité est une affirmation qui correspond (« fits ») à un ou à plusieurs 
des paramètres suivants : critère de la cohérence intérieure ; données sensorielles ; données de 
la mémoire ; croyances non-verbalisées ; autres parties du discours. La structure cognitive gé-
nérale – qui, d’après Ray Jackendoff, sert de point de convergence à la signification transmise 
par le langage, la connaissance d’arrière-plan, la perception, la déduction etc. – est identifiée 
comme intermédiaire de cette correspondance qui entraîne l’effet cognitif : « c’est vrai ». Cette 
théorie affirme en outre que la vérité est une famille de notions qui englobe différentes sortes de 
vérités. Il est souligné que la vérité comporte une dimension normative qui s’explique comme la 
possibilité de défier les affirmations prétendant à la vérité, ce qui suppose un idéal régulateur 
de la rationalité universelle de l’homme.
Mots-clés
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